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ABSTRACT 
 This study investigates whether auditors respond to earnings management 
pressure created by analyst forecasts. Analyst forecasts create an important earnings 
target for management, and professional standards direct auditors to consider how this 
pressure could affect their clients. Using annual analyst forecasts available during the 
planning phase of the audit, I examine whether this form of earnings management 
pressure affects clients’ financial statement misstatements. Next, I investigate whether 
auditors respond to earnings forecast pressure through audit fees and reporting delay. I 
find that higher levels of analyst forecast pressure increase the likelihood of client 
restatement. I also find that auditors charge higher audit fees and delay the issuance of 
the audit report in response to pressure from analyst expectations. Finally, I find that 
when audit clients are subject to high analyst forecast pressure, a high audit fee response 
by auditors mitigates the likelihood of client misstatements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The accounting literature has documented a strong management focus on 
meeting the earnings expectations of external parties. Survey evidence indicates that 
managers perceive significant pressure to meet earnings targets (Graham et al. 2005), 
and research identifies several reasons management feels incentivized to make target 
achievement a priority (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Bartov et al. 2002; Skinner and 
Sloan 2002). Moreover, earnings management studies suggest that managers make 
strategic accounting and economic decisions to ensure their firms meet those targets 
(Degeorge et al. 1999; Brown and Caylor 2005; Graham et al. 2005).1 This intense 
pressure on management is specifically listed as a significant risk factor in 
professional audit standards (AICPA 2002), yet previous research has not 
investigated how auditors respond to the risk created by these earnings targets. This 
study seeks to fill this void in the literature by investigating whether auditors respond 
to earnings management pressure created by analyst forecasts during the planning 
phase of the audit. Furthermore, this study examines whether increased auditor 
response reduces audit risk created from analyst forecast pressure. 
Analyst forecasts that differ from management’s expectations of company results 
create audit risk. Because auditors are aware that management is highly incentivized 
to achieve analyst targets (Nelson et al. 2002), auditors can use analyst forecasts 
                                                 
1 As discussed later in the paper, management may choose to structure transactions that affect economic 
income, adjust judgment and estimates in the accounting process, and/or manage the expectations of 
external parties as components of an earnings management strategy. This paper focuses on the use of 
accounting to achieve earnings benchmarks because the auditor’s attention is on the accounting and 
financial reporting system. 
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available at interim periods to evaluate the potential for client manipulation of 
financial reporting. Prior research has documented that auditors respond to general 
forms of risk such as complexity, inherently risky accounts, profitability, leverage, 
and the industry in which the client operates (Hay et al. 2006). In comparison, 
earnings management pressure from financial analysts represents a unique and 
specific, directional measure of pervasive financial statement risk that has not been 
investigated in the literature.  
Examining how auditors react to earnings management pressure on their clients is 
important because it addresses a topic relevant to practitioners, regulators, and 
academics. The auditor’s professional standard regarding the consideration of fraud, 
SAS 99, specifically instructs auditors to consider the pressure analyst forecasts create 
for management (AICPA 2002). Additionally, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently released several audit standards that direct auditors 
to consider pressure on management—such as from analysts—indicating regulator’s 
recognition of this important audit risk factor (PCAOB 2010b, 2010c). Finally, 
academics have long been endeared to analyst studies (Ramnath et al. 2008a, 2008b; 
Beyer et al. 2010) and earnings management studies (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow 
and Skinner 2000; Dechow et al. 2010). This study builds on those literature streams and 
investigates how earnings management pressure influences auditors. The audit literature 
has acknowledged the important role analysts play in incentivizing audit clients, and 
prior studies examine how auditor characteristics affect a client’s propensity to meet or 
beat analyst forecasts (Reichelt and Wang 2010), how the quality of the auditor affects 
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analyst forecast characteristics (Behn et al. 2008), or how the presence of an analyst 
following affects auditor decisions (Keune and Johnstone 2012). However, these studies 
do not specifically examine how auditors use information provided by analyst forecasts, 
nor do they examine whether auditors are aware of analyst forecasts at interim periods.  
The focus of my study is the difference between earnings information auditors 
can obtain from their clients’ reported results during the planning phase of the audit 
and concurrently-available analyst forecast information. I focus on earnings numbers 
because earnings encompass other internal and external business risks and trends, 
and Graham et al. (2005) find that managers care more about earnings than any other 
financial numbers. Earnings are also a prominent metric for auditors; professional 
guidance suggests that auditors should consider expected annual earnings during the 
planning phase of the audit in connection with their consideration of materiality 
(AICPA 2006a). Because analysts construct their earnings forecasts based on 
expectations about both client-specific factors and broader external factors (Rogers 
and Grant 1997; Chandra et al. 1999; Ramnath et al. 2008b), auditors can use 
analysts’ forecasts to improve their own expectations. Perhaps more importantly, 
differences between analyst forecasts and company trends at interim periods can alert 
auditors to the potential for earnings management.  
I use the restatement of client financial statements due to errors, fraud, or failure 
in the application of GAAP (hereafter “restatements”) as an indicator of material 
misstatement. Prior literature uses restatements as a proxy for material misstatements 
because restatements represent a public acknowledgement by both the client and the 
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current auditor that previous financial statements were misstated (Cao et al. 2012; 
Schmidt 2012; Newton et al. 2013). Because managers are willing to engage in 
earnings management to achieve targets (Graham et al. 2005), audit clients subject to 
greater pressure from analysts are likely to have a greater number of material 
misstatements. To the extent that auditors do not detect and prevent all such 
misstatements during the audit, the possibility of subsequent discovery and 
correction of misstatements increases. Therefore, I investigate whether managers 
yield to earnings management pressure created by analysts by examining the 
association between analyst forecast pressure and financial statement misstatements.  
I use audit fees and audit reporting delay as measures of auditor response. Prior 
literature has found that increased fees may indicate additional audit hours (Bell et 
al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Johnstone et al. 2004), adjustments to the 
experience or expertise of the engagement team staffing mix (Johnstone and Bedard 
2001), or billed risk premiums (Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Hay et al. 2006). If 
auditors respond to earnings management pressure from analyst forecasts in any of 
these ways, their decision should be reflected in higher audit fees. Auditor response 
to analyst forecast pressure could also be manifested in the number of days the 
auditor takes to issue the audit opinion. Audit standards suggest that auditors can 
respond to identified risks by modifying the timing of their procedures to obtain 
better evidence closer to year-end (PCAOB 2010c). Thus, I also test whether 
auditors take longer to issue their report in response to analyst forecast pressure on 
their clients. Finally, auditors’ identification of and response to significant risk 
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should improve audit quality. Therefore, I investigate whether high auditor response 
(i.e. high fees) in situations of high analyst forecast pressure reduces the likelihood 
of client misstatements. 
My findings indicate that significant pressure from analyst forecasts affects both 
management and auditors. I find that increasingly high expectations from analyst 
forecasts increase the propensity for client misstatements. The finding that managers 
misstate financial accounts when analyst pressure is high is consistent with other 
studies that show that managers achieve targets by employing various methods such 
as classification shifting (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010), stock repurchases (Hribar et 
al. 2006), and adjustments to tax accounts (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008). 
My results contribute to that literature stream by documenting an influence on 
management (i.e. analyst forecasts at an interim period) that leads to those methods 
and the potential misstatements derived from them. The increased propensity for 
restatement also has significant economic implications: the increase in the likelihood 
of restatement across the interquartile range of analyst forecast pressure is 19.1 
percent. Although auditors do not prevent all misstatements related to the increased 
misstatement risk from analyst forecast pressure, I do find that auditors respond to 
analyst forecast pressure. Specifically, auditors bill an average of 7.6 percent higher 
fees and take 3.3 percent longer to issue their opinion for clients subject to high 
analyst forecast pressure relative to clients subject to low pressure.  
I also find that a significant response by auditors mitigates the risk of 
misstatement associated with high analyst expectations. My results suggest that 
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auditors whose audit fee response ranks in the 75th percentile reduce the likelihood of 
restatement by 24.1 percent compared to auditors ranked in the 25th percentile of 
audit fees when their clients are subject to above-median analyst forecast pressure. 
Additionally, I find that the likelihood of client restatement is no different for high-
response auditors with clients in high-pressure situations than the likelihood of 
restatement for low-response auditors with clients in low-pressure situations. These 
findings suggest that on average, auditors who respond to perceived risk from analyst 
forecasts can reduce the increased likelihood of restatement for clients with high 
earnings management potential.  
This study contributes to the audit literature in several ways. My results show 
that auditors are attuned to indicators of risk at interim periods in addition to the 
year-end risk indicators studied in prior audit research. This finding suggests that 
future audit research should consider other information that is available throughout 
the course of the year rather than focusing only on year-end variables. This study 
also contributes to the audit literature by showing that auditors use specific 
information provided by analysts to tailor their procedures to the individual earnings 
management risk of their clients. Further, I find that auditors who respond to analyst 
forecast information can identify and mitigate a significant risk of material 
misstatement. These findings are particularly interesting because (1) they highlight a 
scenario in which auditors are following audit standards despite limited attention 
from regulators or the public, and (2) adherence to these standards significantly 
enhances audit quality.  
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This study also offers insights to practitioners and regulators and contributes to 
other streams of literature. First, auditors should find this study valuable because my 
results show that following the guidance set forth in SAS 99 and Auditing Standard 
No. 12 significantly decreases audit risk. The findings of this study should also 
interest regulators, who may wish to highlight the benefits of auditor attention to 
analyst forecasts or to issue more specific guidance to auditors to facilitate best 
practices across the audit industry. Finally, my study extends both the earnings 
management literature and the analyst forecast literature. I show a link between 
interim-period analyst forecast pressure and subsequent restatements—a finding that 
broadens academics’ understanding of the potential consequences of management’s 
focus on analysts’ expectations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the 
background and theory I use to develop my hypotheses. Section III describes my sample 
selection and research methods, and Section IV presents results from my tests. Finally, 
Section V summarizes this study. 
 8 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background on Analysts’ Forecasts and Earnings Management 
The academic literature includes numerous studies investigating earnings 
management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the 
alteration of financial reports either through judgment in financial reporting choices 
or through transaction structuring with the intent to influence users of the financial 
statements (see also Dechow et al. 2010 for a review of earnings management 
studies). Managers have various incentives to report financial results in a particular 
light—research finds that implications for stock price, management reputation, 
employee compensation, and debt considerations motivate managers to present 
financial statements as favorably as possible (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Matsunaga and Park 2001; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Graham et al. 2005; Francis et 
al. 2008). 
Users of financial information often weigh operational results against a particular 
benchmark when assessing the degree of firm or manager success. This monitoring 
by investors, lenders, and other stakeholders creates pressure on management to meet 
common thresholds. Prior literature identifies earnings targets such as positive 
profits, increases over prior profits, and analyst expectations as prominent earnings 
targets (Degeorge et al. 1999). However, in the last decade, managers and financial 
statement users have increasingly measured firm success relative to analyst earnings 
forecasts. Graham et al. (2005) find that CFOs consider analyst forecasts as one of 
their top two targets, and Brown and Caylor (2005) demonstrate that managers’ 
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actions indicate that analyst targets are of primary concern. Managers feel this 
concern for earnings targets because they believe that missing earnings targets sends 
signals to financial statement users that the firm has “deep previously unknown 
problems” or “uncertainty about future prospects” (Graham et al. 2005, p. 29).  
Prior research has also documented consequences to a firm’s performance 
relative to analyst forecast targets. For example, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find 
that the market places a high value on stocks of firms that consistently meet 
expectations while Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that missing analyst targets can 
result in large declines in stock price. Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2002) document 
that firms that meet or beat analyst expectations receive a return premium over those 
that miss analyst expectations. They also note that even firms that likely reach targets 
through earnings management receive a small premium. In addition to these 
documented consequences, financial executives perceive that meeting targets such as 
analyst forecasts is important for a variety of reasons including building credibility 
with financial markets, conveying future growth potential to investors, and achieving 
desired debt ratings (Graham et al. 2005). The combination of known and perceived 
consequences for firm performance relative to analyst forecasts suggests that 
managers are subject to significant pressure to align financial statement numbers 
with earnings targets. 
 Managers have several alternative methods to achieve earnings targets. Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) identify judgment in accounting information as well as 
transaction structuring as possible earnings management tools. The use of non-
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accounting mechanisms is supported by studies about “real earnings management” 
such as Roychowdhury (2006), who finds that managers use price discounting, 
overproduction, and reduction of discretionary expenses to meet earnings 
expectations. In fact, survey evidence from Graham et al. (2005) indicates that 
managers prefer such real actions over accounting-based methods of achieving 
targets. Another potential management tool to achieve targets is to change the targets 
themselves. Matsumoto (2002) and Brown and Pinello (2007) find that firms avoid 
negative earnings surprises using both upward accounting-based earnings 
management and downward management of analyst expectations. Thus, managers 
can draw upon multiple methods to ensure that their firms meet the expectations of 
analysts. 
When does earnings management occur? Studies suggest that managers engage 
in earnings management near the end of the year in order to meet annual 
expectations. Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) argue that managers are most likely to 
manage earnings in the fourth quarter because many incentives and expectations 
relate to the full year. Recent research confirms this assertion, finding that firms 
achieve earnings targets using changes in tax expense assumptions from the third to 
fourth quarters (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008) and classification shifting in 
the fourth quarter (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010). Further, Salamon and Stober 
(1994) find a difference in earnings characteristics in the fourth quarter relative to 
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earnings in other quarters. This evidence suggests that managers make adjustments 
late in the year to meet external expectations.2  
The timing of earnings management described above as well as the inclination 
for managers to use earnings management techniques to meet benchmarks (Healy 
and Wahlen 1999; Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006) suggests that managers 
make interim evaluations of firm performance relative to annual earnings targets. 
Research documents that managers are optimistic about the future prospects of their 
firms (Lev 2003; Graham et al. 2005), and the management choice to wait until the 
final portion of the year to manage earnings is consistent with this notion. An 
optimistic manager is likely to rely on economic earnings until it becomes apparent 
that the firm’s present earnings trend will not reach the earnings target. At that point 
managers can either structure transactions or attempt to “borrow” earnings from 
future periods to meet current earnings targets. Lev (2003) and Graham et al. (2005) 
indicate that managers are optimistic that their firms will recover and be able to 
make up borrowed income in a future period.  
A manager’s interim evaluation of firm progress toward an annual target can 
result in several possible scenarios. First, when analyst forecasts are greater than the 
company’s current earnings trajectory, management may feel pressure to report more 
aggressively. This decision increases the possibility that the financial statements 
include materially misstated amounts that are restated in a future year. Second, when 
                                                 
2 Brown and Pinello (2007) suggest that earnings management opportunities are actually greater at interim 
periods due to constraints on the financial reporting process at year-end (e.g. an independent audit). 
However, results from prior studies and from my tests indicate that earnings management does occur in 
the later part of the year regardless of these constraints. 
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analyst expectations are similar to the company’s current trajectory, the expected 
likelihood of misstatement is lower than under the first scenario, although 
management could use accounting discretion to ensure the company stays on track. 
Finally, when analyst expectations are below the company’s current trajectory, 
analyst forecasts would not create pressure on management to manage earnings 
upward.3 In fact, this case might provide an opportunity for managers to establish 
“cookie-jar reserves” (Levitt 1998). However, income-decreasing earnings 
management is less likely to result in future restatements than income-increasing 
earnings management. Evidence suggests that financial statement users prefer 
conservative reporting (Basu 1997; Watts 2003a; Watts 2003b), and Newton et al. 
(2013) document that most restatements correct prior overstatements. Because 
managers and auditors are generally more focused on income-increasing earnings 
management (Nelson et al. 2002), conservative-leaning misstatements are less likely 
to result in future restatements. 
In summary, because a firm’s performance relative to earnings benchmarks 
results in significant economic consequences, managers are likely to feel external 
pressure to meet earnings targets. On average, managers tend to be optimistic about 
their firms’ progress towards earnings targets. When interim firm results are not 
trending toward analysts’ expectations, managers are incentivized to employ 
available methods of earnings management, including changing accounting 
                                                 
3 Another possible scenario is that the difference between analyst forecasts and management’s expectation 
is so extreme that meeting analysts’ expectations is unrealistic. I attempt to focus on the scenarios where 
analyst forecasts create pressure on management, so I exclude this potential scenario from my study by 
using only observations within certain thresholds discussed later in this paper. 
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presentation and assumptions. Management’s use of accounting-based techniques 
increases the likelihood of material misstatements in the financial statements. If 
auditors do not fully prevent these misstatements, the client and/or auditors are more 
likely to discover and report these misstatements in future years, resulting in 
financial statement restatements. Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: The likelihood of restatement is positively associated with interim-period 
analyst forecast pressure.  
Background on Auditor Response 
Auditors are likely to notice earnings pressure on their clients and respond to the 
pressure as a significant risk factor.4 The audit profession has undergone a risk-
focused transformation beginning in the 1990s. This evolution started as audit firms 
increasingly incorporated risk-management principles in their audit methodologies 
(Knechel 2007). Firms evolved further in accordance with professional guidance 
such as SAS 99 that directed engagement teams to consider fraud risks in planning 
their audits (AICPA 2002). The passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the 
establishment of the PCAOB further incentivized auditors to focus on risk. The 
following statement made in 2010 by Daniel L. Goelzer, acting PCAOB chairman, 
describes the importance of auditor attention to risk: 
Assessing and responding to risk is at the core of what auditors do. The 
[PCAOB’s] mandate is to ensure quality auditing and to promote investor 
                                                 
4 Audit standards indicate that client efforts to meet earnings expectations may result in qualitatively 
material misstatements, so auditors should be attuned to risks present from analyst forecasts (AICPA 
2006a). In addition, the design of this study is based on conversations with current and former audit 
partners, managers, and seniors from several Big 4 firms. My discussions with these auditors indicate that 
audit procedures evaluating analyst forecasts are common on audit engagements, and that audit plans are 
sensitive to analyst forecast pressure. 
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confidence in audited financial statements. Therefore, focusing on the risk 
assessment process and the auditor's response to risk is one of the most 
important steps we can take to fulfill our statutory mandate. (Goelzer 2010) 
Mr. Goelzer’s statement corresponded to the PCAOB’s release of new audit 
standards on audit risk (PCAOB 2010a), risk assessment (PCAOB 2010b), and 
response to risk (PCAOB 2010c).  
In light of the increasing focus of the audit profession and audit regulators on 
risk, researchers have investigated how a variety of risk factors affect auditor 
response. Charles et al. (2010) show that audit fees are positively associated with 
overall financial reporting risk. Other studies find that auditors increase audit fees 
due to risks associated with internal control weaknesses (Hogan and Wilkins 2008; 
Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011), aggressive business strategy (Bentley et al. 2012), 
short interest (Cassell et al. 2011), or optimistic pro forma numbers (Chen et al. 
2012). These studies build on the results in the meta-analysis of audit fees conducted 
by Hay et al. (2006). Their summary of numerous studies indicates that audit fees 
reflect risks from inherently risky accounts, client complexity, client operations, and 
other risk-related client attributes. Thus, prior evidence suggests that auditors 
increase audit fees in response to identified risk factors. 
Auditors must plan their audit engagement—including anticipated response to 
potential risks—based on incomplete client information. Bell et al. (2005) note that 
auditors often begin planning how they will address identified risk factors in the first 
two quarters of the year. The benefit of this timing is that auditors can observe early 
pressure on management from analyst earnings forecasts. Thus, as managers begin 
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planning strategies to achieve earnings targets (hypothesized in H1), auditors can 
tailor their audits to mitigate the anticipated increase in the risk of misstatement. 
When auditors identify significant risks relating to material misstatement, they may 
increase planned procedures, include more senior staff, or involve specialists (Bell et 
al. 2005). In addition, identification of such risk factors early in the year gives 
auditors more time to plan specific adjustments to their audit plan to mitigate 
identified risks.5  
The studies of auditor attention to risk cited above use audit fees to measure 
auditors’ responses. Audit fees are representative of strategic decisions auditors 
make to tailor the audit to mitigate risks of material misstatements. Any of the audit 
plan adjustments noted by Bell et al. (2005) would result in increases in audit fees, so 
I use audit fees as a proxy for auditor response.6 Due to the prominence of risk 
assessment in professional standards, the focus of the PCAOB on monitoring 
auditors’ risk assessment and response, and changes in the firms’ methodologies 
toward risk assessment, I expect that auditors will respond to the analyst forecast 
pressure on their clients. This expectation leads to the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
5 The ability to adjust audit fees based on an interim-period modification of the audit plan requires some 
flexibility in the amount auditors can charge their clients. Based on my discussions with practicing 
auditors, audit engagement contracts include such flexibility in the form of contracts that stipulate a rate-
per-hour but allow an open-ended amount of hours (particularly in the few years after SOX) or a range of 
expected audit hours. 
6 Prior literature indicates that audit fees represent changes in audit effort (e.g. hours, involvement of 
specialists, or involvement of more experienced auditors) or a risk premium (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Bedard 
and Johnstone 2004; Bell et al. 2005; Hay et al. 2006). I measure analyst forecast pressure during an 
interim period when the rate per hour is already generally set, so my results are unlikely to result from risk 
premiums. 
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H2: Audit fees are positively associated with interim-period analyst forecast 
pressure.  
Auditor response to potential earnings management can also be manifested in 
delayed issuance of the audit report. Bell et al. (2005) note that auditors who identify 
elevated risks of misstatement usually modify audit procedures throughout the 
remaining audit engagement. This modification can include obtaining more reliable 
evidence, auditing more locations, or performing more procedures at year-end. Audit 
standards indicate that auditors should modify the timing of their procedures to 
obtain better evidence closer to year-end in response to identified risks (PCAOB 
2010c). An increase in procedures at year-end increases the likelihood that auditors 
take longer to issue the audit report. Ettredge et al. (2006) study audit report delay 
and find that delays are longer when auditors encounter and adjust audit procedures 
for problems in their client’s internal control quality. Based on such findings, I 
expect that auditors who modify their procedures due to earnings management 
pressure will take longer to issue the audit report because of increased effort at year-
end. I state this expectation formally in the following hypothesis: 
H3: Audit report delay is positively associated with interim-period analyst 
forecast pressure. 
The discussion of auditor response thus far has focused on auditors’ concern that 
their clients meet analyst expectations through income-increasing accounting 
discretion. However, pessimistic analyst expectations could also be an indication of 
potential risk. Research suggests that auditors are not as concerned about 
understatements (Nelson et al. 2002), but auditors might interpret overly pessimistic 
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analyst forecasts as a signal of potential client problems. If auditors believe that 
analyst pessimism is indicative of expected declines in their clients’ operations or 
industry, the auditors are likely to increase the scope of their procedures to arrive at 
an acceptable level of audit risk. Prior literature notes that auditors are defendants in 
the majority of litigation that occurs against a bankrupt client (Carcello and Palmrose 
1994), so auditors will likely react to analyst forecasts that foreshadow trouble for 
their clients.7 Because pessimistic analyst forecasts can provide information that is 
useful to auditors, I also examine whether auditors increase audit effort when analyst 
expectations are pessimistic relative to client trajectory. If auditors respond to analyst 
pessimism in addition to analyst optimism, the relationship between auditor response 
and analyst forecast pressure would be nonlinear. This relationship would result in 
auditor effort increasing as analyst forecasts become increasingly positive or 
increasingly negative relative to the client’s projected results. I explore this 
relationship by examining the following research question: 
RQ1: Are audit fees and audit report delay higher in response to both optimistic 
and pessimistic analyst forecasts? 
The adjustments in audit methodology and increased focus on risk assessments 
by professional standards and the PCAOB should have implications for audit quality. 
For the purposes of this study, I define audit quality in terms of audit risk. Audit risk 
is the risk that auditors express an unqualified opinion when the financial statements 
are materially misstated (PCAOB 2010a). Instances where financial statements are 
                                                 
7 My conversations with current and former auditors provide anecdotal evidence that auditors consider 
large differences between analyst forecasts and client trajectory as risk indicators, regardless of the 
direction of the difference. 
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subsequently restated due to errors or failure in the application of GAAP are 
indicative of audit failure, and thereby considered to be of poor quality.8 It follows 
that financial statements that are subsequently restated are associated with lower 
quality, on average, than financial statements that are not subsequently restated.  
Theoretically, auditors who exert higher effort should detect and prevent a 
greater number of misstatements (Matsumura and Tucker 1992). Two recent studies 
confirm this theory by finding that higher audit fees are associated with a lower 
likelihood of restatement (Blankley et al. 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013). These studies 
indicate that restatements are due to low audit effort, so I expect that auditors who 
exert higher effort reduce the likelihood of misstatements. However, it is not obvious 
whether an appropriate auditor response can fully mitigate the increased likelihood 
of restatement hypothesized in H1. Blankley et al. (2012) and Lobo and Zhao (2013) 
indicate that additional effort decreases the likelihood of restatement, but not that 
additional effort eliminates restatements. Thus, the following hypothesis predicts that 
auditors whose clients are subject to high pressure can reduce the likelihood of client 
restatement by increasing audit effort, although I also investigate the extent to which 
the efforts of these auditors reduce the likelihood of restatements relative to auditors 
whose clients are subject to lower pressure from analyst expectations.  
H4: Abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with subsequent restatements 
for audit clients subject to elevated interim-period analyst forecast pressure. 
                                                 
8 Recent survey evidence documented by Christensen et al. (2012) indicates that audit partners view 
restatements as the number one public signal of low audit quality.  
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III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH METHODS 
Client Restatement Tests 
In this section I describe the sample selection process and the empirical models used 
to test my hypotheses. First, I construct the dataset using company data from Compustat, 
analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, auditor data from Audit Analytics, stock return data 
from CRSP, and institutional ownership from Thomsen Financial. I exclude years prior 
to 2003 to focus on the years when important changes in the audit profession relating to 
risk were in place (i.e. implementation of SAS 99 and the Sarbanes Oxley Act). I end the 
study period in 2010 to ensure sufficient time to capture subsequent restatements. As 
shown in Table 1, the dataset used to examine auditor response consists of 14,522 firm-
years with available data for all variables. Further data limitations reduce this number to 
12,507 for the restatement tests. All continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. Table 2 provides definitions for 
all variables used in this study. 
My first hypothesis predicts that managers subject to higher analyst forecast pressure 
are more likely to engage in earnings management. I measure earnings management 
using two versions of subsequently-announced restatements of current-year financial 
statements. The first variable, Restated, includes any restatement due to fraud, errors, or 
failure in the application of GAAP. The second restatement variable, Restated_adverse, 
includes only those restatements that have a negative impact on the financial statements. 
Because analyst forecast pressure is a measurement of income-increasing earnings 
management incentive, I expect Restated_adverse to align more directly with the actions 
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taken by management to meet analysts’ expectations. I use the following logistic 
regression model to test this hypothesis. The model includes year and Fama and French 
(1997) 48 industry indicators, and standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009).9 
Restated or Restated_adverse = β0 + β1Pressure + β2Size + β3Segs + β4Firm_age + 
β5Volatility + β6Leverage + β7Merger + β8Restructure + β9Xtra + β10Growth + 
β11Loss + β12ROA + β13Lit_risk + β14Material_weakness + β15Analysts + 
β16Forecast_err + β17Big4 + β18Specialist + β19New_auditor + β20F_score + 
FF48 Indicators + Year Indicators + ε (1) 
The variable of interest in Model (1) is Pressure, which captures the degree to which 
annual analyst forecasts available shortly after the second quarter differ from the 
company’s projected earnings based on two quarters of results. A positive coefficient on 
Pressure would support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that managers are more likely to 
record misstated numbers in an attempt to meet analyst expectations.  
The estimation model uses control variables present in other restatement studies 
(Kohlbeck et al. 2008; Romanus et al. 2008; Carcello et al. 2011; Cao et al. 2012; Lobo 
and Zhao 2013; Newton et al. 2013), as well as variables to control for audit quality 
(Davis et al. 2009; Francis and Yu 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010). I also include 
F_score, which is a measure of the probability of a fraud-related restatement developed 
by Dechow et al. (2011) and Analysts, which represents the number of analysts 
following the company. Finally, I include forecast error (Forecast_err) in year t-1 to 
control for previous differences between reported and actual earnings. 
                                                 
9 Tests following Belsley et al. (1980) indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue any of the regression 
models. 
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Construction of Analyst Pressure 
The variable Pressure represents the difference between analyst forecasts and the 
company’s expected annual results based on actual performance through the second 
quarter. To construct Pressure, I first obtain annual EPS forecasts from the I/B/E/S 
unadjusted detail dataset. I construct a median consensus estimate using the most recent 
forecast made by each analyst available one week after the end of the second quarter. I 
delete forecasts made before earnings were announced for the first quarter because the 
information in those forecasts may be stale. I use this consensus as the analyst 
expectation of annual earnings available to managers and auditors during the auditors’ 
performance of the second-quarter review. My expectation is that managers—having just 
completed the quarterly reporting process—are likely to evaluate and update their 
expectations about the likelihood of the company reaching expected annual earnings 
targets. Because my measurement of Pressure corresponds to the timing of audit 
planning, I also expect that auditors will update their planned procedures based on risks 
identified from recent financial information. 
To determine the extent to which analyst forecasts represent earnings management 
pressure on the company, managers and auditors must create an annual expectation and 
compare it to analyst forecasts. Managers calculate their own projection to determine 
what they need to do to achieve analyst expectations. Auditors are also likely to make 
their own predictions about annual earnings based on professional guidance for 
materiality calculations (AICPA 2006a). An important consideration in this process is 
that analysts focus on Street numbers rather than GAAP accounting numbers (Bradshaw 
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and Sloan 2002). Despite this reporting difference, managers must compare their 
anticipated performance to analyst expectations, and auditors must consider how analyst 
forecasts might put pressure on management. Thus, I anticipate that both managers and 
auditors will reconcile the difference between results year-to-date and analyst forecasts.  
I follow Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) in reconciling between I/B/E/S analyst forecasts 
and GAAP information. They note that data compiled by I/B/E/S excludes extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations, and they indicate that many of the remaining 
differences between Street earnings and GAAP earnings are coded as special items in 
Compustat. Using data from the Compustat Unrestated Quarterly dataset, I sum together 
earnings before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and special items from the 
first two quarters. I then project the two-quarter results onto a full year, adjusting for the 
prior-year seasonality of the company’s operations.10 Finally, I transform the projected 
expectation into an EPS number that is comparable to analyst forecasts. I use either the 
diluted or basic shares used for EPS from Compustat based on the I/B/E/S basic/diluted 
flag. I also adjust the analyst forecast number for stock splits occurring between the 
forecast date and year-end using the split-adjustment factors in CRSP. These procedures 
result in two annual earnings projections (i.e. an analyst forecast and a projection based 
on two-quarter results) as of the period shortly after the second-quarter period-end. 
                                                 
10 I adjust the current-year earnings projection for differences in the company’s earnings among the 
quarters in the prior year. Specifically, I calculate the percentage of the firm’s prior-year operating income 
that occurred in the first two quarters and then divide the current year’s two-quarter results by this 
percentage. The adjustment ensures that current year expectations account for the company’s business 
cycle (e.g. retail firms earn more income in the quarter that includes November and December than in 
other quarters).  
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The final step in constructing the variable Pressure is to compare the two 
expectations. I subtract the annualized projection from the consensus forecast, which 
provides an EPS-value difference where larger numbers are indicative of greater 
earnings expectations from analysts relative to the projection based on results.11 This 
difference is negative when analyst forecasts are lower than the company’s current 
trajectory and positive when analyst forecasts are higher than the company’s current 
trajectory. I define the variable Pressure such that increasing values of Pressure 
correspond to increasing levels of income-increasing analyst expectations for the 
company. 
The distribution of Pressure includes a wide range of differences between analyst 
expectations and projections from second-quarter results. Prior meet-or-beat studies 
generally use small ranges such as plus or minus one cent, five cents, or 15 cents per 
share (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008) and exclude observations outside of the 
selected range. Degeorge et al. (1999) show a distribution of forecast errors, with the 
tails trimmed at plus/minus 20 cents per share. However, Degeorge et al. (1999) and 
other similar studies use differences between actual earnings and the prevailing analyst 
consensus near year-end (e.g. Degeorge et al. have an average horizon of six weeks). My 
study differs significantly from those studies because I compare expected earnings and 
analyst forecasts approximately six months before actual annual earnings are known, and 
                                                 
11 My study uses unscaled EPS differences between analyst forecasts and projected earnings because 
analysts and managers tend to focus on raw EPS numbers (Graham et al. 2005; Cheong and Thomas 
2011), and I expect that auditors will similarly consider EPS. Furthermore, Cheong and Thomas (2011) 
find that forecast error does not vary with scale, and Pressure’s construction is similar to forecast error. In 
robustness tests, I rerun all models after scaling Pressure by price and assets with consistent inferences.  
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larger differences are expected because of greater uncertainty. In addition, my study 
focuses on the difference between analyst forecasts and company trajectory rather than 
actual annual earnings (i.e. Pressure differs from forecast error). Pressure indicates a 
preliminary indication of the distance managers might adjust earnings, and they can 
make those adjustments through several methods including judgment in the application 
of GAAP, altering real activities, and managing analysts’ expectations. In contrast, meet 
or beat studies often examine analyst forecast pressure at year-end, when management 
has less flexibility in achieving targets.  
In order to focus my study on a range of differences that is likely to impact managers 
and auditors and that is not due to unusual events that could cause extreme differences in 
expectations, I eliminate values of Pressure in the tails of the distribution. I retain 
observations where the difference between the analyst earnings forecasts and a simple 
projection is between negative and positive $1.12 The variable Pressure used in 
subsequent regressions is the decile-ranked value of this difference, which I use for ease 
of interpretation of economic significance.13 Figure 1 shows the distribution of Pressure 
based on the final sample of firm-year observations. 
                                                 
12 The use of a cutoff of plus/minus $1 leads to a sample containing 87 percent of the observations in the 
complete dataset. Because the selection of $1 is subjective, I perform sensitivity tests using all 
observations after trimming the top and bottom 1 percent or trimming at plus/minus $1.50, $0.50, and 
$0.25. Inferences for these cutoffs are generally consistent with my main results. See the additional 
analyses section for further discussion of these tests. 
13 Statistical inferences are consistent when I use the raw value of the difference between analyst forecasts 
and projected earnings. 
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Audit Fee Tests 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that auditors respond to the earnings management pressure 
placed on audit clients by analyst forecasts. Specifically, I examine whether auditors 
charge higher fees as the pressure on management increases. I use the following OLS 
model to test this prediction. The model includes year and Fama and French (1997) 48 
industry indicators, and standard errors are clustered by firm. 
LFees = β0 + β1Pressure + β2Size + β3Segs + β4Inv_rec + β5Cata + β6Liquidity+ 
β7Leverage + β8Merger + β9Restructure + β10Xtra + β11Growth + β12Financing 
+ β13Loss + β14ROA + β15Foreign + β16Restate_announced + β17Lit_risk + 
β18Material_weakness + β19Analysts + β20Forecast_err + β21Ded_inst + β22Big4 
+ β23Specialist + β24New_auditor + β25Fee_ratio+ β26Dec_ye + β27GC_opinion 
+ β28Report_delay + FF48 Indicators + Year Indicators + ε (2) 
Model (2) regresses the log of audit fees from Audit Analytics on a comprehensive 
set of independent variables. As in Model (1), I am primarily interested in the coefficient 
on the variable Pressure. A positive coefficient would support H2, which suggests that 
auditors respond to the earnings management pressure that is placed on management. To 
investigate whether audit fees have a nonlinear association with analyst forecast 
pressure, I add the squared term of Pressure to Model (2). For both tests, I include the 
control variables related to analyst following and prior forecast accuracy from Model 
(1). The remaining control variables follow the categories described in Hay et al. (2006) 
and include variables for client attributes of size, complexity, inherent risk, profitability, 
leverage, ownership, internal control weaknesses, and industry as well as auditor 
attributes such as quality, tenure, audit timing, audit problems, and non-audit services.  
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Audit Report Delay Tests 
As another test of auditor response to earnings management pressure, I investigate 
whether audit reporting delay increases as forecast pressure increases. To test this 
hypothesis, I use a negative binomial model that regresses audit report delay on Pressure 
and control variables. I use negative binomial regression because the dependent variable 
is a count of days from year-end to report date, and the distribution is over-dispersed 
(Long and Freese 2006). As in the previous models, I include industry and year 
indicators and cluster standard errors by firm: 
Report_delay = β0 + β1Pressure + β2Size + β3Segs + β4Large_filer+ β5Leverage + 
β6Merger + β7Restructure + β8Xtra + β9Growth + β10Financing + β11Loss + 
β12ROA + β13Restate_announced + β14Material_weakness + β15Analysts + 
β16Forecast_err + β17Big4 + β18Specialist + β19New_auditor + β20Dec_ye + 
β21GC_opinion + β22Scaled_fees + FF48 Indicators + Year Indicators + ε (3) 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive coefficient on Pressure, indicating that year-end audit 
reporting delay is longer when clients experience greater analyst forecast pressure 
shortly after the end of the second quarter. This finding would be consistent with the 
idea that auditors increase planned procedures when they perceive additional risks 
during the year. To investigate whether report delay has a nonlinear association with 
analyst forecast pressure, I add the squared Pressure term to the model and investigate 
the coefficients on both Pressure and Pressure_squared. Under both specifications, the 
included control variables primarily follow the model in Ettredge et al. (2006), and I add 
analyst-related variables from the prior models. 
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Auditor Effort and Audit Quality Tests 
My final hypothesis predicts that auditors who adjust their procedures in response to 
earnings management risk will be more likely to prevent material misstatements from 
occurring. To test this hypothesis, I augment Model (1) with the auditor response 
variable – abnormal audit fees. I use Restated_adverse as the dependent variable because 
I expect it to be better aligned with the income-increasing expectations of analyst 
forecast pressure. To obtain abnormal audit fees, I estimate Model (2) excluding 
Pressure. The resulting fee model captures elements identified in Hay et al. (2006), with 
residuals (Abnormal_fees) representing auditor response beyond the expected level (i.e., 
without accounting for analyst forecast pressure). I estimate the modified Model (1) with 
Abnormal_fees included in four separate ways. First, I control for Pressure and examine 
the association between Abnormal_fees and annual restatements across the full sample. 
Second, I examine the effect of Abnormal_fees on restatements for observations with 
above-median values of Pressure. This regression tests whether auditor effort is 
effective in reducing audit risk even in situations of high analyst expectations. Third, I 
examine the effect of Abnormal_fees on restatements for observations with below-
median values of Pressure. Finally, I replace Pressure and Abnormal_fees with indicator 
variables representing above-median values of each variable and interact the two 
indicator variables. The purpose of this test is to determine how audit effort affects the 
likelihood of restatement for audit clients subject to high analyst forecast pressure 
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relative to clients subject to low pressure. Across each of these four tests, I expect that 
auditors who have a high response to high pressure can reduce client misstatements.14   
                                                 
14 Lobo and Zhao (2013) argue that auditor effort (higher audit fees) reduces restatements of audited 
financials only. Thus, my sample excludes all firm-years that included restatements of interim periods 
only. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. The key variable is Pressure, 
which is the ranked difference between analyst forecasts and the second-quarter 
projected EPS of the company. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the raw value of 
Pressure (Pressure_raw). The sample mean and median values are $0.029 per share, 
while the standard deviation of Pressure_raw is $0.35 per share. The mean log of 
number of analysts following the sample firms is 2.1, which corresponds to about 8 
analysts. This value is similar to other research (e.g. Cheong and Thomas 2011; Keune 
and Johnstone 2012). Forecast_err is the absolute value of the difference between 
analyst forecasts at prior-year second quarter and actual earnings at the end of the prior 
year. The mean value is $0.22 per share, although the mean of the signed value 
(untabulated) is $0.06. These values are larger than short-horizon forecast errors 
common to many studies because of the long horizon at the point of measurement.  
The remaining variables in Table 3 are commonly found in prior audit fee and 
restatement studies. The descriptive statistics for these variables indicate that client and 
auditor characteristics as well as financial reporting problems or audit issues are 
reasonable in comparison to other studies (e.g. Francis et al. 2005; Hay et al. 2006; 
Ettredge et al. 2006; Romanus et al. 2008; Bentley et al. 2012; Cao et al. 2012; Chen et 
al. 2012; Keune and Johnstone 2012; Munsif et al. 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013; Newton 
et al. 2013).  
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Table 4 presents the Pearson correlations between certain pairs of variables. The 
table includes correlations between the variable of interest, the dependent variables in 
the following regressions, and other variables used in the multivariate analyses 
representing client-related events occurring during the year.15 Pairwise correlations that 
are significant at p<0.05 are presented in bold. Pressure is positively correlated with 
restatements and audit report delay in the hypothesized direction but is correlated with 
audit fees in the direction opposite of the prediction in Hypothesis 2. However, Pressure 
is positively correlated with audit fees purged of other influences on auditor response 
(Abnormal_fees). Pressure is not highly correlated with any of the event-related 
variables included in the table, which supports the assertion that Pressure is capturing 
analyst forecast pressure rather than expectations about an infrequent transaction. 
Multivariate Results 
I report tests of Hypothesis 1 in Table 5. Hypothesis 1 predicts that managers are 
influenced by analyst pressure during the year and engage in earnings management to 
meet analyst expectations. As shown in the first column of Table 5, the coefficient on 
Pressure is positive and significant. This association indicates that increasing pressure 
on management due to analyst expectations increases the likelihood of restatement. The 
second regression in Table 5 replaces the general restatement indicator with an indicator 
for instances of restatements that adversely affect the financial statements. The results of 
this regression also indicate a positive association that is highly significant. These 
                                                 
15 The variable Pressure captures the difference between company trajectory and analyst expectations. 
These event-related control variables are included in the correlation table as well as the multivariate 
analyses to ensure that Pressure is not capturing an unusual event or transaction. 
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findings support Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with the idea that management uses 
accounting-based earnings management to increase earnings.  
The results presented in Table 5 also have economic significance. I focus the 
discussion on the results in the second regression of Table 5 because restatements with 
negative effects on the financial statements would be the most likely restatement 
consequence to instances where management was significantly influenced by income-
increasing analyst forecast pressure. I use the odds ratio on Pressure (untabulated) to 
determine the change in the likelihood of restatement for a one-unit change in Pressure. 
The odds ratio indicates that a one-decile increase in Pressure results in a 3.6 percent 
increase in the likelihood of an adverse-effect restatement. The increased likelihood is 
particularly meaningful when considering that a change across the interquartile range 
(from decile 3 to decile 8) increases the likelihood of restatement by 19.1 percent. Thus, 
the results suggest that analyst pressure on management has both statistical and 
economic significance. 
The control variables in the regression also offer a few interesting inferences. For 
example, Big 4 clients and industry specialist auditors are not any less likely to have 
restatements, but clients of first-year auditors are less likely to restate their financial 
statements. Firms that have volatile stock returns, material weakness in internal controls, 
or larger analyst followings are more likely to experience a restatement, and adverse 
restatements are more likely when the fraud-related factors identified by Dechow et al. 
(2011) are present.  
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Table 6 presents results from the tests of auditor response through adjustments to 
audit fees (Hypothesis 2). In the first column of results, the focus is the variable 
Pressure. The results indicate that auditors respond to analyst forecast pressure on 
management. Specifically, Pressure is positive and highly significant, supporting the 
notion that auditors are aware of the risk imposed on their clients by optimistic analyst 
forecasts. Because the fee model includes risk-based control variables from prior 
research, I conclude that auditors are aware of and respond to risk created by analyst 
forecasts in addition to other types of risk. The second column of results displays a 
significant coefficient on both Pressure and Pressure_squared. Figure 2, Panel A shows 
the predicted relationship between Pressure and audit fees based on the coefficients of 
this regression. Findings from this regression indicate that auditors increase audit fees in 
response to both pessimistic and optimistic analyst forecasts. However, it is interesting 
to note that predicted values are much higher when audit clients have significant 
pressure to increase earnings, consistent with auditors’ focus on overstatements (Nelson 
et al. 2002). 
The audit fees test does not identify exactly how auditors respond to the risk from 
analyst forecasts. Professional guidance suggests that auditors can change the nature, 
extent, or timing of their procedures (AICPA 2006b), and research suggests they alter 
staffing experience, increase hours, or use experts (Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Bell et 
al. 2005). Although I am unable to identify the exact auditor response, I attempt to 
determine the economic significance of the auditor fee adjustment in response to 
Pressure. Because the relationship is shown to be nonlinear in the second regression, I 
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use the coefficients on Pressure and Pressure_squared to determine the economic 
significance. I find that a change from the point where analyst forecasts are aligned with 
client trajectory at the second quarter (i.e. decile 5) to the highest level of Pressure (i.e. 
decile 10) increases audit fees 7.6 percent, or approximately $88,000, based on the mean 
level of audit fees in the sample. These findings indicate that auditor response to analyst 
forecast pressure is both statistically and economically significant. 
There are interesting results for other variables in the fee model as well. For 
example, I find that auditors charge higher fees for other risk-related events included in 
the model (e.g. mergers, restructuring, foreign operations, number of business segments, 
etc.). I also find that auditors charge lower fees when clients have a greater analyst 
following. The remaining variables are common to fee models in other studies, and the 
associations generally follow expectations based on that research (Francis et al. 2005; 
Hay et al. 2006; Cassell et al. 2011; Bentley et al. 2012).  
The results in Table 6 provide preliminary evidence that auditors respond to analyst 
forecast pressure on their clients. I use the audit report delay regressions in Table 7 to 
further test this prediction. Hypothesis 3 posits that auditors respond to analyst forecast 
pressure by increasing procedures during the year-end portion of the audit. As shown in 
the first set of results in Table 7, the coefficient on Pressure is significantly positive, 
indicating that auditors take longer to issue their opinion when analyst pressure is higher. 
The second set of results in Table 7 further documents the nonlinear relationship found 
in the audit fee tests. The results from Table 7 suggest that at least some of the auditor 
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response noted in Table 6 is due to increases in audit procedures during the post-year-
end timeframe of the audit.  
Figure 2 Panel B shows the predicted effect of Pressure on audit report delay using 
the coefficients from the second regression in Table 7. The nonlinear relationship 
between analyst pressure and audit report delay is similar to the relationship between 
Pressure and audit fees. The two panels of Figure 2 indicate that auditors respond to 
both optimistic and pessimistic analyst forecasts. In both cases, however, auditors appear 
to respond more significantly when analyst pressure incentivizes their clients to manage 
earnings upward. In terms of economic significance for the audit reporting delay model, 
the coefficients on Pressure and Pressure_squared in the second regression indicate that 
an increase in Pressure from the point where analyst forecasts and auditor expectations 
are similar (i.e. decile 5) to the highest level of Pressure (i.e. decile 10) would increase 
audit report delay by 3.3 percent, or an average of 2.1 days based on the sample mean. 
These results indicate that auditors respond to high earnings management pressure with a 
moderate increase in audit hours during the final phase of the audit.16 Thus, the results 
for the audit reporting delay test support Hypothesis 3 and are consistent with the results 
in Table 6. 
My final hypothesis predicts that auditors whose clients are facing elevated analyst 
forecast pressure are able to reduce the risk of material misstatement through 
adjustments to audit effort. I measure auditor effort using the residuals from a 
                                                 
16 The increase in audit delay likely would not account for the full increase in audit fees. This suggests that 
the auditor response documented in Table 6 includes other actions such as use of experts or additional 
work during interim periods.  
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comprehensive fee model. Prior literature commonly uses fee-model residuals as an 
indication of abnormal audit effort (Gul 2006; Srinidhi and Gul 2007; Lobo and Zhao 
2013). The rationale for the use of abnormal fees in this test is that additional effort by 
auditors above that which is expected based on certain auditor and client characteristics 
can contribute to lower overall audit risk, and should benefit auditors and clients facing 
high risk of earnings management. Table 8 presents four analyses testing the relationship 
between abnormal audit fees and adverse-effect restatements of the financial statements. 
The first regression uses the full sample of observations and controls for the amount of 
Pressure. The variable of interest is Abnormal_fees, which is the decile-ranked value of 
the residuals from the audit fee model. The coefficient on Abnormal_fees is negative and 
significant, which suggests that auditors can reduce material misstatements by increasing 
effort (as proxied by audit fees). The results from this regression show that auditors can 
decrease the likelihood of restatement by increasing audit effort while holding the level 
of earnings management pressure constant.  
The next two regressions in Table 8 examine the association between abnormal 
auditor effort and restatements for subgroups of the full sample. The second regression 
includes only those firm-years where Pressure is in the top half of the distribution, and 
Pressure is omitted from the estimation. These observations represent the audit clients 
where managers are likely to feel the most pressure to increase earnings. The variable of 
interest is Abnormal_fees, which is the raw value of fee-model residuals ranked into 
deciles across the subsample. The results indicate that abnormal auditor effort in the 
presence of elevated analyst forecast pressure is effective at reducing the likelihood of 
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client restatement in accordance with H4. The third regression examines the association 
between Abnormal_fees and restatements when analyst forecast pressure is low. The 
effect of auditor effort in this regression is weaker than in the high pressure sample.  
The final regression in Table 8 uses indicator variables for clients subject to high 
pressure (i.e. above median Pressure) and auditors exerting high effort (i.e. above 
median Abnormal_fees). I also interact these two indicators to further investigate 
whether any incremental benefit exists for additional effort in the presence of high 
analyst forecast pressure. The coefficient on the High_pressure variable is positive, 
which is consistent with previous results. The coefficients on High_fees and the 
interaction term are negative but are not significant. The sum of these three variables 
represents the difference in likelihood of restatement for auditors exerting high effort 
when their clients are subject to high pressure relative to auditors exerting low effort 
when their clients are subject to low pressure. I test whether the sum of the coefficients 
on these three variables differs from zero to determine differences between these groups. 
A chi-square test indicates that the sum of the coefficients on the three variables does not 
differ from zero. This result provides evidence of the benefit auditors obtain by 
responding to situations of high analyst forecast pressure: their clients are at no higher 
risk of subsequent restatements than auditors exerting low effort when analyst forecast 
pressure is low.  
The economic significance of my findings provides an interesting application for 
auditors. The results previously discussed in Table 5 indicate that clients in the 75th 
percentile of Pressure are 19.1 percent more likely to restate their financial statements 
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than a client in the 25th percentile. The results from the second regression in Table 8 
indicate how an auditor’s response affects client restatement for an average client subject 
to high pressure (i.e. at the 75th percentile of Pressure). The economic significance of the 
coefficient in this regression indicates that auditors that increase abnormal audit effort 
from the 25th to 75th percentile decrease the likelihood of client restatement by 24.1 
percent. This decrease in restatement likelihood provides further support to the idea that 
increases in audit effort can reduce restatement likelihood to a level similar to auditor-
client relationships with low Pressure and low audit effort. Furthermore, the results in 
the first regression in Table 8 indicate that auditors can reduce the likelihood of 
restatement by increasing audit effort controlling for the level of Pressure. The overall 
results from Table 8 indicate that auditors can reduce the likelihood of restatement by 
increasing audit effort. The application for practicing auditors is that increasing audit 
effort in the presence of earnings management risk is necessary to mitigate misstatement 
risk, but additional effort increases audit quality regardless of the level of misstatement 
risk. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
To explore the robustness of the findings documented in the main tests of this study, 
I conduct several sensitivity analyses by varying the sample selection and design choices 
as documented in the following sections.  
Separate Analyses of Positive and Negative Pressure – In the tests documented 
above, the raw values underlying the ranked variable Pressure have included both 
positive and negative values. My tests have shown that positive and negative values have 
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somewhat different effects on the actions of management and auditors. This finding is 
consistent with prior research, which indicates that managers and auditors tend to be 
more focused on income-increasing earnings management (Nelson et al. 2002; 
Caramanis and Lennox 2008). Because of the different incentives for positive and 
negative earnings management, I conduct tests on positive and negative analyst pressure 
separately. To investigate these possibilities, I separate Pressure_raw into two variables. 
The variable Pressure_pos is a decile ranking of positive values of Pressure_raw and is 
set to zero when Pressure_raw is negative. Similarly, the variable Pressure_neg is a 
decile ranking of negative values of Pressure_raw and is set to zero when Pressure_raw 
is positive. Using these adjusted analyst pressure variables, I rerun the regressions in 
Table 5, 6 and 7.  
Results from these regressions largely confirm the results previously tabulated. In the 
restatement regression, I find a marginally significant, positive slope on Pressure_pos 
but an insignificant slop on Pressure_neg. Further investigation indicates that 
Pressure_pos is positively associated with restatements to a point (i.e. approximately 
$0.29 per share) before the association disappears. These results provide some support 
for the idea that most of the increased restatement likelihood documented in Table 5 is 
due to the association between upward earnings-management pressure and client 
restatements but only when the analyst target is relatively more achievable. In the audit 
fee regression, the coefficients on Pressure_pos and Pressure_neg are statistically 
significant. These results indicate that auditors charge higher fees as the analyst forecast 
increases in distance from the current trajectory of the company. An F-test also indicates 
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that the slope is greater on the positive value of analyst pressure (p=0.01), suggesting 
that auditors are more responsive to income-increasing earnings management pressure. 
In the audit report delay regression, the coefficients on both variables are also 
significant, and an F-test indicates a steeper slope on the positive values of Pressure. 
This result is consistent with the fee model, and supports the inference that auditors are 
more responsive to income-increasing pressure. My results are consistent with prior 
literature. Nelson et al. (2002) present survey evidence that auditors are more likely to 
require that management correct income-increasing attempts at earnings manipulation. 
Keune and Johnstone (2009) examine adjustments recorded under SAB 108 and find that 
auditors are more likely to consider income-decreasing misstatements immaterial than 
income-increasing misstatements. My results are consistent with these findings, 
indicating that auditors place a higher priority on addressing income-increasing 
misstatements.  
Raw Value of Analyst Pressure – All previous analyses use a decile-ranked value of 
Pressure for ease of interpretation. To ensure that my results are not driven by the use of 
this ranking, I rerun the regressions in each table using the raw value of Pressure. The 
coefficient on Pressure is significant in the Restated_adverse regression, but weaker in 
the Restated regression. The coefficient on the raw value of Pressure is statistically 
significant in the audit fee and audit report delay regressions with p-values of less than 
0.05. In the nonlinear specification model for audit fees and audit report delay, the 
squared Pressure term is also statistically significant. The variable Abnormal_fees used 
in the auditor response model in Table 8 is also a ranked variable. For this robustness 
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test, I use the raw value of Abnormal_fees, and the coefficient on Abnormal_fees 
remains significantly negative. Thus, inferences are unchanged using the raw values of 
Pressure and Abnormal_fees.  
Other Ranges of Analyst Pressure – Throughout my main tests, I have limited the 
dataset to values of analyst pressure between -$1 (i.e. analysts are pessimistic relative to 
current company trajectory) and +$1 (i.e. analysts are optimistic relative to current 
company trajectory). My selection of this range was based on an examination of the 
distribution of Pressure and my intention to study a range where managers and auditors 
recognize earnings management pressure. To ensure my results are not driven by my 
selection of the +/- $1 range, I rerun the restatement tests (Table 5), audit fees tests 
(Table 6), and audit report delay tests (Table 7) using the following +/- ranges: $1.50, 
$0.50, and $0.25 as well as the full dataset after trimming the top and bottom 1 percent 
of Pressure. The linear associations across each of these ranges are consistent with the 
results presented in the tables except for the audit report delay model in the +/- $0.25 
range. The nonlinear relationship in the fee and audit report delay models gets weaker as 
the range gets narrower. This result is not surprising because an increasingly small range 
of the Pressure distribution eliminates the elevated ends of the nonlinear relationship 
shown in Figure 2. Because the relationship is stronger on the income-increasing end, 
the linear relationship holds in narrower ranges. The general results of these analyses are 
consistent with my main tests, supporting the inference that auditors increase fees and 
audit work at year-end in response to high income-increasing analyst pressure.  
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Analyst Pressure Scaled by Price or Assets – The unranked value of Pressure in my 
models is an earnings per share value. Some studies examining analyst forecasts scale 
EPS values by price (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002) or assets per share (Doyle et al. 2003). 
First, I rerun the models in Tables 5-7 using a decile ranking of Pressure scaled by the 
share price at prior-year end. I also scale the variable Forecast_err because it is an EPS 
number. To limit the influence of outliers, I delete observations with share prices less 
than $1. All inferences documented in my main tests are identical using this alternate 
variable construction. Next, I repeat this scaling process using price from the end of the 
second quarter, which occurs shortly before the measurement of Pressure. All inferences 
are also consistent under this method. Finally, I rerun each of my main models using a 
decile ranking of Pressure scaled by total assets per share at prior-year end. All 
inferences in the restatement and audit fee models are consistent using this definition of 
Pressure; however, I find only a linear relationship between pressure and audit report 
delay.  
Clients Audited by Big 4 Auditors – Some audit-related studies focus only on Big 4 
auditors (e.g. Francis and Yu 2009) because of noted differences in quality between Big 
4 and non-Big 4 auditors (Behn et al. 2008). Thus, I conduct a sensitivity test by 
rerunning the audit fee model and the audit report delay model in Tables 6 and 7 using 
only clients audited by Big 4 auditors. The results of these regressions are consistent 
with the findings in my main models.  
Company Trends at Other Interim Quarters – For my main tests I use an expected 
earnings result for a company based on its actual results through the second quarter. The 
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rationale for this timeframe is that optimistic managers can wait and see how the 
company performs through two quarters before recognizing a potential shortfall in 
earnings. After results from the second quarter are finalized, managers have time to 
incorporate earnings management strategies into the third and fourth quarters. The 
timing for auditors is also relevant because it occurs during the planning phase of the 
audit. During planning, auditors determine a preliminary materiality level, often by 
considering annualized income. This step enables them to compare projected income to 
analyst forecasts, alerting them to a potential red flag of client risk. However, some 
research identifies the fourth quarter as a key period for earnings management (Dahliwal 
et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008), and managers are likely aware of the company’s trends 
throughout the entire year. Additionally, auditors begin their planning as early as the first 
quarter and continue to reevaluate risks throughout the year (Bell et al. 2005). Thus, I 
also consider pressure on management at both the first and third quarters. 
I construct Pressure variables at each quarter following the methodology previously 
described for the second-quarter measurement. Then, I rerun the restatement and audit 
fee models using the new Pressure variables. In the restatement model, inferences from 
these tests are consistent with the results presented in Table 5. I find a significant linear 
relationship between Pressure and restatements at each quarter. The results of the audit 
fee regressions are shown in Table 9. In Panel A, I find consistent results in the 
regressions testing the linear relationship between Pressure and audit fees. However, 
Panel B indicates that the nonlinear relationship between Pressure and fees is significant 
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only in the second and third quarters. Thus, it appears that audit plans are more 
responsive to information obtained later in the year. 
I also compare the magnitude of the effects of Pressure on restatements and audit 
fees across the three quarters. For restatements, the coefficients are 0.049 for Q1, 0.035 
for Q2, and 0.046 for Q3. Economically, these coefficients mean that companies in the 
75th percentile of Pressure are 27.8 percent, 19.1 percent, and 25.9 percent more likely 
to have a restatement than companies in the 25th percentile when Pressure is measured in 
Q1, Q2, and Q3, respectively. Using seemingly-unrelated regression, I compare these 
coefficients but find that they do not differ statistically. I next examine the economic 
significance of analyst pressure on audit fees across the two quarters where the nonlinear 
association is significant (i.e. Q2 and Q3). The economic significance of a change in 
Pressure from the point where analyst forecasts are similar to auditor expectations to the 
highest level of Pressure results in an increase of audit fees of approximately $88,000 in 
Q2 and $105,000 in Q3, and the differences in the coefficients in Q2 and Q3 compared 
to Q1 are statistically significant (p<0.05). These results suggest that auditors are most 
likely to respond to forecast pressure on management when they observe the pressure in 
the latter half of the year. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates how managers and auditors respond to analyst forecast 
pressure. I find evidence that increased analyst forecast pressure results in an increased 
risk of misstatements in the financial statements. Companies in the 75th percentile of 
analyst forecast pressure are 19.1 percent more likely to subsequently restate their 
financial statements than companies in the 25th percentile of analyst pressure. This 
finding is consistent with results in prior studies that show analyst forecasts as a primary 
concern of management. I also find that auditors respond to this increased risk factor by 
increasing both audit fees and the time between year-end and the audit report date. This 
response is also economically significant: auditors bill an average of 7.6 percent higher 
fees and take 3.3 percent longer to issue their opinion for clients subject to high analyst 
forecast pressure relative to clients subject to low pressure. Further, I find that auditors 
who increase audit fees when their clients are subject to high earnings management 
pressure are able to significantly reduce the likelihood of subsequent restatement.  
During the past decade, practitioners, regulators, and academics have recognized a 
shift in the audit process toward increased risk assessment and appropriate auditor 
response. This study is important because it identifies a specific timeframe in which both 
managers and auditors identify and respond to outside earnings pressure. This study also 
suggests that, on average, audit clients subject to elevated analyst forecast pressure file 
financial statements with more material misstatements, but auditors who respond to this 
publicly-available risk factor can reduce the likelihood that their clients’ financial 
statements are misstated. These findings suggest that auditors can mitigate the risk of 
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audit failure and provide greater service to financial statement users by following the 
guidance set forth in recent auditing standards. 
This study provides several contributions to the accounting literature. Prior studies 
have examined many facets of the relationship between analyst forecasts and firms’ 
propensity to manage earnings toward those forecasts. My study links interim-period 
analyst forecast pressure and client restatements. Because of this link, my study 
demonstrates that analyst forecasts are useful to auditors. In addition, whereas previous 
literature focuses on meeting analyst targets at year-end, I demonstrate that auditors 
begin altering their audit procedures in response to analyst forecasts as early as the first 
quarter. These findings extend both the earnings management literature and the analyst 
forecast literature. Finally, my focus on practical auditing considerations indicates that in 
general, the audit profession proactively follows certain audit standards issued by the 
PCAOB and the Auditing Standards Board in order to mitigate audit risk. Auditors 
follow these procedures despite the fact that these specific actions are rarely, if ever, 
included in public statements and inspection reports issued by the PCAOB or in other 
public discussions related to audit quality. My results show a significant benefit to 
auditors who adjust their procedures in response to risk created by analyst forecasts, 
which should be of interest both to the auditing profession and to regulatory agencies 
charged with improving audit quality. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Analyst Forecast Pressure 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the distribution of the variable Pressure. Pressure is measured as the difference 
between the median consensus of annual analyst forecasts and a projection of the company’s income based 
on actual results through two quarters of operations. Pressure is trimmed at values of -$1 and $1.  
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FIGURE 2 
Influence of Analyst Forecast Pressure on Audit Fees and Audit Report Delay 
 
Panel A – Audit Fees 
 
 
Panel B – Audit Report Delay 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the predicted effect of analyst forecast pressure on audit fees (Panel A) and audit 
report delay (Panel B) using the coefficients from regression models in Tables 6 and 7. The raw values of 
Pressure range from -$1 to $1. The value of zero for analyst forecast pressure is included in the fifth 
decile.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
Total Compustat firms 2003-2010 74,253 
  
Variable of Interest 
 
Less: firm-years without timely I/B/E/S forecasts (45,188) 
Less: firm-years without Compustat Quarterly data to calculate Pressure (1,438) 
  
Control Variables 
 
Less: firm-years with missing Compustat data (6,094) 
Less: firm-years with missing Audit Analytics data (2,318) 
Less: firm-years with missing CRSP data (12) 
Less: firm-years with missing I/B/E/S data (2,472) 
  
Dataset Screening 
 
Less: firm-years with values of Pressure exceeding +/- $1 (2,179) 
  
Observations in auditor response dataset 14,552 
  
Restatement Dataset  
Less: firm-years missing data for additional restatement variables (1,501) 
Less: firm-years with non-annual restatements (5,44) 
  
Observations in restatement dataset 12,507 
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TABLE 2 
Variable Definitions 
Analyst Variables  
Pressure_raw The difference between the prevailing median consensus estimate and projected 
annual income. The median consensus is calculated using the most recent annual 
forecast from each analyst made in the period after Q1 results are announced 
through one week after the end of Q2. Projected income is calculated by 
annualizing current-year income before extraordinary and special items through Q2 
with an adjustment for the seasonality of the business based on prior-year operating 
income 
Pressure Decile ranking of the variable, Pressure_raw 
Pressure_squared The squared value of the decile-ranked variable, Pressure 
Analysts The log of the number of unique analysts following the company during year t 
Forecast_err The absolute value of the difference between the analyst consensus forecast using 
prior-year second-quarter information and the actual prior-year EPS value 
Auditor Variables  
LFees Log of audit fees 
Scaled_fees Audit fees divided by total assets 
Abnormal_fees Residuals from the fee model shown in model (2) except that Pressure is excluded 
from the model  
Report_delay The number of days between year-end and the audit report date 
Big4 Indicator variable if client is audited by a Big 4 auditor 
Specialist Indicator variable set to one if client is audited by an auditor with both 50 percent 
MSA-industry market share and 30 percent national-industry market share 
Fee_ratio The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid by the client to its auditor 
New_auditor Indicator variable set to one if the client/auditor engagement is in its first year 
GC_opinion Indicator variable set to one if client received a going-concern opinion 
Client Variables  
Restate_announced Indicator variable set to one if the client announced a restatement in the current year 
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TABLE 2 Continued 
Client Variables Continued 
Restated Indicator variable set to one if the financial statements at year-end are subsequently 
restated 
Restated_adverse Indicator variable set to one if the financial statements at year-end are subsequently 
restated due to a restatement that has an adverse effect on the financial statements 
Cata Current assets divided by total assets 
Ded_inst The percentage of the client’s shares owned by dedicated institutional owners 
following Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001) 
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets 
Foreign Profit before tax from foreign operations divided by total profit before tax 
Growth Percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t 
Inv_rec Inventory plus receivables divided by lagged total assets 
Firm_age Log of number of years since the client first appeared in Compustat 
Financing Indicator variable set to one if the client’s long-term debt increased 20% or the 
client’s shares increased 10% during the current year 
F_score The scaled probability of a fraud-related restatement following Dechow et al. 
(2011). Probability is estimated by regressing an indicator for a fraud-related 
restatement on RSST accruals, change in receivables, change in inventory, soft 
assets, change in cash sales, change in ROA, issuance of securities, abnormal 
change in number of employees, existence of operating leases, market-adjusted 
stock return, and lagged market-adjusted stock return 
Large_filer Indicator variable set to one if the client’s filing status is large, accelerated filer 
Liquidity Current assets less inventory divided by current liabilities 
Lit_risk Indicator variable set to one if client operates in a litigious industry (SIC 2833-
2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, or 7370) 
Loss Indicator variable set to one if client has negative net income in year t 
Material_weakness Indicator variable set to one if the client has a material weakness reported at year-
end 
Merger Indicator variable set to one if the client experiences a merger in year t (as described 
in a footnote) 
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TABLE 2 Continued 
Client Variables Continued 
Restructure Indicator variable set to one if the client has any restructuring expenses in year t 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets 
Segs Square root of the number of business segments 
Size Log of total assets 
Xtra Indicator variable set to one if the client has extraordinary items or discontinued 
operations in year t 
Dec_ye Indicator set to one if the client reports on a calendar year-end 
Volatility Standard deviation of the client’s daily stock returns for year t from CRSP 
Note: This table provides definitions of the variables used in regressions. All continuous control variables 
used in the regression models are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Pressure_raw 0.029 0.346 -0.143_ 0.029 0.210 
LFees 13.959 1.080 13.227 13.898 14.631 
Size 6.651 1.740 5.375 6.554 7.782 
Segs 1.406 0.504 1.000 1.000 1.732 
Inv_rec 0.251 0.185 0.102 0.220 0.356 
Cata 0.483 0.241 0.297 0.478 0.668 
Liquidity 2.292 2.235 1.001 1.538 2.648 
Leverage 0.178 0.196 0.000 0.130 0.285 
Merger 0.216 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restructure 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Xtra 0.095 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Growth 0.137 0.327 -0.002_ 0.088 0.203 
Financing 0.196 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loss 0.270 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA -0.004_ 0.188 -0.006_ 0.041 0.080 
Foreign 0.165 0.551 0.000 0.000 0.238 
Restate_announced 0.070 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lit_risk 0.300 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Material_weakness 0.064 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Analysts 2.064 0.831 1.609 2.079 2.708 
Forecast_err 0.223 0.345 0.045 0.110 0.255 
Ded_inst 0.081 0.080 0.008 0.061 0.129 
Big4 0.872 0.334 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Specialist 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
New_auditor 0.047 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fee_ratio 0.171 0.152 0.050 0.134 0.255 
Dec_ye 0.693 0.461 0.000 1.000 1.000 
GC_opinion 0.013 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Report_delay 62.682 20.240 54.000 60.000 72.000 
Large_filer 0.361 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Scaled_fees 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Firm_age 2.765 0.722 2.197 2.639 3.332 
Volatility 0.030 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.037 
Restated 0.138 0.345 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restated_adverse 0.125 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F_score 1.009 0.579 0.530 0.887 1.385 
Note: Variable definitions are shown in Table 2. N=14,522 for all variables except F_score, where 
N=12,507.
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TABLE 4 
Correlation Table 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Pressure 
            
2 LFees -0.02            
3 Abnormal_fees 0.04 0.44           
4 Report_delay 0.07 -0.05 0.02          
5 Restated 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.17         
6 Restated_adverse 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.88        
7 Merger 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01       
8 Restructure 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01      
9 Xtra 0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01     
10 Financing -0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.01 -0.02    
11 Restate_announced 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.28 0.24 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01   
12 Material_weakness 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.18 
 
13 GC_opinion 0.00 -0.09 0.01 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 
Note: Variable definitions are shown in Table 2. This table presents Pearson correlations for certain variables used in the multivariate analyses. Bolded 
coefficients are significant at p<0.05, two tailed.
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TABLE 5 
The Effect of Analyst Forecast Pressure on the Likelihood of Restatements 
 
DV = Restated 
 
DV = Restated_adverse 
Variables  Coef. p-value 
 
 Coef. p-value 
Pressure  0.025** (0.037) 
 
 0.035*** (0.005) 
Size -0.016 (0.745) 
 
-0.009 (0.855) 
Segs  0.037 (0.741) 
 
-0.001 (0.991) 
Firm_age -0.112 (0.157) 
 
-0.089 (0.272) 
Volatility 13.396*** (0.001) 
 
11.716*** (0.003) 
Leverage  0.458* (0.079) 
 
 0.408 (0.119) 
Merger -0.009 (0.925) 
 
-0.053 (0.576) 
Restructure -0.146 (0.450) 
 
-0.071 (0.710) 
Xtra -0.060 (0.640) 
 
-0.149 (0.262) 
Growth -0.183 (0.143) 
 
-0.070 (0.563) 
Loss -0.031 (0.790) 
 
-0.029 (0.803) 
ROA  0.606* (0.062) 
 
 0.528 (0.113) 
Lit_risk  0.391** (0.021) 
 
 0.328** (0.047) 
Material_weakness  2.228*** (0.000) 
 
 2.087*** (0.000) 
Analysts  0.171** (0.023) 
 
 0.182** (0.016) 
Forecast_err  0.189* (0.085) 
 
 0.125 (0.259) 
Big4  0.195 (0.246) 
 
 0.250 (0.148) 
Specialist  0.022 (0.870) 
 
-0.030 (0.826) 
New_auditor -0.486*** (0.009) 
 
-0.332* (0.065) 
F_Score  0.081 (0.386) 
 
 0.165* (0.072) 
FF48 & Year Indicators  Yes 
  
 Yes 
 
      
Observations  12,507 
  
 12,341 
 
ROC  0.780      0.762   
Pseudo R2  0.163    0.144  
Note: This table presents regression results examining the association between analyst forecast pressure 
and restatements after controlling for other determinants of restatements. The regression model presented 
in the table uses logistic regression and clusters standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009). Restated firm-
years in the first regression that do not have an adverse effect on the financial statements are excluded 
from the second regression. Variable definitions are shown in Table 2. The intercept and coefficients on 
year and Fama & French 48 industry fixed effects are not reported for brevity. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of Analyst Forecast Pressure on Audit Fees 
 
DV = LFees 
 
DV = LFees 
Variables  Coef. p-value 
 
 Coef. p-value 
Pressure  0.006*** (0.000) 
 
-0.015** (0.024) 
Pressure_squared 
   
 0.002*** (0.001) 
Size  0.559*** (0.000) 
 
 0.558*** (0.000) 
Segs  0.142*** (0.000) 
 
 0.142*** (0.000) 
Inv_rec -0.010 (0.875) 
 
-0.010 (0.875) 
Cata  0.792*** (0.000) 
 
 0.788*** (0.000) 
Liquidity -0.058*** (0.000) 
 
-0.057*** (0.000) 
Leverage -0.000 (0.994) 
 
-0.003 (0.958) 
Merger  0.084*** (0.000) 
 
 0.084*** (0.000) 
Restructure  0.082*** (0.005) 
 
 0.083*** (0.004) 
Xtra  0.116*** (0.000) 
 
 0.114*** (0.000) 
Growth -0.063*** (0.000) 
 
-0.065*** (0.000) 
Financing  0.001 (0.929) 
 
 0.002 (0.882) 
Loss  0.099*** (0.000) 
 
 0.098*** (0.000) 
ROA -0.222*** (0.000) 
 
-0.221*** (0.000) 
Foreign  0.114*** (0.000) 
 
 0.114*** (0.000) 
Restate_announced  0.119*** (0.000) 
 
 0.118*** (0.000) 
Lit_risk -0.032 (0.344) 
 
-0.031 (0.359) 
Material_weakness  0.267*** (0.000) 
 
 0.266*** (0.000) 
Analysts -0.035*** (0.004) 
 
-0.034*** (0.004) 
Forecast_err  0.006 (0.680) 
 
-0.002 (0.907) 
Ded_inst -0.120 (0.179) 
 
-0.121 (0.175) 
Big4  0.244*** (0.000) 
 
 0.243*** (0.000) 
Specialist  0.085*** (0.000) 
 
 0.085*** (0.000) 
New_auditor -0.134*** (0.000) 
 
-0.134*** (0.000) 
Fee_ratio -0.611*** (0.000) 
 
-0.609*** (0.000) 
Dec_ye  0.070*** (0.000) 
 
 0.071*** (0.000) 
GC_opinion  0.075* (0.078) 
 
 0.077* (0.071) 
Report_delay  0.004*** (0.000) 
 
 0.003*** (0.000) 
FF48 & Year Indicators  Yes 
  
 Yes 
 
      
Observations  14,522 
  
 14,522 
 
Adjusted R2  0.798      0.798   
Note: This table presents regressions examining the association between analyst forecast pressure and 
audit fees after controlling for other determinants of audit fees. Regression models presented in the table 
use OLS regression and cluster standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009). Variable definitions are shown in 
Table 2. Intercepts and coefficients on year and Fama & French 48 industry fixed effects are not reported 
for brevity. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Analyst Forecast Pressure on Audit Report Delay 
  DV = Report_delay 
 
DV = Report_delay 
Variables  Coef. p-value 
 
 Coef. p-value 
Pressure  0.002*** (0.001) 
 
-0.007** (0.012) 
Pressure_squared 
   
 0.001*** (0.001) 
Size -0.012*** (0.000) 
 
-0.013*** (0.000) 
Segs  0.006 (0.287) 
 
 0.006 (0.306) 
Large_filer -0.091*** (0.000) 
 
-0.091*** (0.000) 
Leverage  0.063*** (0.000) 
 
 0.062*** (0.000) 
Merger  0.023*** (0.000) 
 
 0.024*** (0.000) 
Restructure  0.017 (0.379) 
 
 0.017 (0.370) 
Xtra  0.022*** (0.009) 
 
 0.021** (0.012) 
Growth  0.004 (0.486) 
 
 0.004 (0.564) 
Financing -0.007 (0.171) 
 
-0.007 (0.193) 
Loss  0.021*** (0.003) 
 
 0.020*** (0.004) 
ROA  0.010 (0.581) 
 
 0.011 (0.536) 
Restate_announced  0.087*** (0.000) 
 
 0.086*** (0.000) 
Material_weakness  0.291*** (0.000) 
 
 0.290*** (0.000) 
Analysts -0.019*** (0.000) 
 
-0.018*** (0.000) 
Forecast_err  0.010* (0.056) 
 
 0.006 (0.228) 
Big4  0.006 (0.503) 
 
 0.006 (0.522) 
Specialist  0.000 (0.961) 
 
 0.000 (0.950) 
New_auditor  0.046*** (0.000) 
 
 0.046*** (0.000) 
Dec_ye  0.016** (0.017) 
 
 0.016** (0.016) 
GC_opinion  0.095*** (0.000) 
 
 0.095*** (0.000) 
Scaled_fees  9.620*** (0.000) 
 
 9.653*** (0.000) 
FF48 & Year Indicators  Yes 
  
 Yes 
 
      
Observations  14,522 
  
 14,522 
 
Wald  3683.37 
 
   3683.95 
 
Wald p-value  0.00      0.00   
Note: This table presents regression results examining the association between analyst forecast pressure 
and audit report delay after controlling for other determinants of audit report delay. Regression models 
presented in the table use negative binomial regression and cluster standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009). 
Variable definitions are shown in Table 2. Intercepts and coefficients on year and Fama & French 48 
industry fixed effects are not reported for brevity. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
The Effect of Auditor Response to Analyst Forecast Pressure on the Likelihood of Restatements 
 
DV = Restated_adverse 
Full Sample  
DV = Restated_adverse 
High Pressure Sample  
DV = Restated_adverse 
Low Pressure Sample  
DV = Restated_adverse 
Full Sample 
Variables  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Pressure  0.037*** (0.003) 
 
        
High_pressure   
 
       0.317*** (0.001) 
Abnormal_fees -0.042*** (0.008) 
 
-0.055*** (0.003)  -0.029 (0.179)    
High_fees   
 
      -0.111 (0.339) 
High_pressure*High_fees   
 
      -0.217 (0.120) 
Size -0.010 (0.844) 
 
 0.016 (0.779)  -0.039 (0.581)  -0.008 (0.878) 
Segs  0.001 (0.990) 
 
 0.020 (0.891)  -0.001 (0.995)  -0.003 (0.980) 
Firm_age -0.087 (0.285) 
 
-0.093 (0.327)  -0.086 (0.438)  -0.090 (0.266) 
Volatility 12.503*** (0.002) 
 
15.413*** (0.003)   9.739* (0.086)  12.431*** (0.002) 
Leverage  0.408 (0.119) 
 
 0.343 (0.255)   0.475 (0.223)   0.393 (0.135) 
Merger -0.054 (0.573) 
 
-0.073 (0.547)   0.010 (0.942)  -0.056 (0.557) 
Restructure -0.070 (0.712) 
 
-0.303 (0.218)   0.265 (0.338)  -0.059 (0.758) 
Xtra -0.148 (0.261) 
 
-0.153 (0.375)  -0.139 (0.473)  -0.147 (0.266) 
Growth -0.073 (0.549) 
 
 0.029 (0.853)  -0.222 (0.206)  -0.070 (0.565) 
Loss -0.028 (0.811) 
 
 0.138 (0.330)  -0.323 (0.109)  -0.025 (0.829) 
ROA  0.551 (0.100) 
 
 0.901** (0.048)   0.129 (0.766)   0.538 (0.108) 
Lit_risk  0.328** (0.048) 
 
 0.356* (0.079)   0.281 (0.162)   0.322* (0.053) 
Material_weakness  2.085*** (0.000) 
 
 1.892*** (0.000)   2.401*** (0.000)   2.082*** (0.000) 
Analysts  0.185** (0.014) 
 
 0.111 (0.217)   0.266** (0.014)   0.184** (0.015) 
Forecast_err  0.124 (0.267) 
 
 0.236* (0.056)   0.022 (0.913)   0.125 (0.260) 
Big4  0.253 (0.142) 
 
 0.268 (0.191)   0.250 (0.279)   0.255 (0.140) 
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TABLE 8 Continued 
 
 
DV = Restated_adverse 
Full Sample  
DV = Restated_adverse 
High Pressure Sample  
DV = Restated_adverse 
Low Pressure Sample  
DV = Restated_adverse 
Full Sample 
Variables  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Specialist -0.026 (0.852) 
 
-0.321* (0.068)   0.212 (0.239)  -0.031 (0.824) 
New_auditor -0.329* (0.066) 
 
-0.475** (0.038)  -0.120 (0.683)  -0.336* (0.061) 
F_Score  0.182** (0.045)   0.155 (0.148)   0.183 (0.137)   0.177* (0.052) 
FF48 & Year Indicators  Yes 
  
 Yes 
  
 Yes 
  
 Yes 
 
            
Observations 12,341 
  
 6,173 
  
 6,168 
  
12,341 
 
ROC  0.762 
  
 0.770 
  
 0.774   
 
 0.763   
Pseudo R2  0.146    0.155     0.155    0.146  
 
Chi-square Test of Coefficients  
High_pressure + High_fees + High_pressure*High_fees = 0 chi2(1) = 0.01, Prob > chi-square = 0.9207 
  
Note: This table presents regression results examining the association between auditor response and adverse-effect restatements after controlling for 
other determinants of restatements. Regression models presented in the table use logistic regression and cluster standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009). 
Variable definitions are shown in Table 2. Intercepts and coefficients on year and Fama & French 48 industry fixed effects are not reported for brevity. 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 9 
The Effect of Analyst Forecast Pressure on Audit Fees at Interim Quarters 
 
Panel A – Tests of Linear Relationship 
 
1st Quarter  
DV = LFees  
2nd Quarter  
DV = LFees  
3rd Quarter  
DV = LFees 
Variables Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
         
Pressure 0.005*** (0.001) 
 
0.006*** (0.000) 
 
0.005*** (0.002) 
         
Control Variables Yes   Yes   Yes  
FF48 & Year Indicators Yes   Yes   Yes  
         
Observations 12,102 
  
14,522 
  
15,163 
 
Adjusted R2 0.796 
  
0.798 
  
0.798 
 
 
 
Panel B – Tests of Nonlinear Relationship 
 
1st Quarter  
DV = LFees  
2nd Quarter  
DV = LFees  
3rd Quarter  
DV = LFees 
Variables  Coef. p-value 
 
 Coef. p-value 
 
 Coef. p-value 
         
Pressure -0.000 (0.957) 
 
-0.015** (0.020) 
 
-0.021*** (0.001) 
Pressure_squared  0.001 (0.369) 
 
 0.002*** (0.001) 
 
 0.003*** (0.000) 
         
Control Variables  Yes    Yes    Yes  
FF48 & Year Indicators  Yes     Yes    Yes  
         
Observations  12,102 
  
 14,522 
  
 15,163 
 
Adjusted R2  0.796 
  
 0.798 
  
 0.798 
 
Note: This table presents regressions examining the association between analyst forecast pressure and 
audit fees at each of the quarterly reporting periods. Regression models presented in the table use OLS 
regression and cluster standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009). Variable definitions are shown in Table 2. 
Intercepts and coefficients on controls and year and Fama & French 48 industry fixed effects are not 
reported for brevity. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
